Conditionals in Late Egyptian by Collier, Mark
Mark  Collier
Conditionals in Late Egyptian*
Abstract:  Late Egyptian has three basic forms of  conditional constructions, 
which can be identified by the three separate introductory markers used (ỉr, ỉnn, 
and hn), as well as by other grammatical features of the P-clause. In terms of 
 P-clauses, attested  ỉr-conditionals cover  forward-looking conditions,  present 
counterfactuals,  closed past conditions; attested  ỉnn-conditionals cover subjec-
tively uncertain past and present conditions, and pre-emptive predictions of the 
 future; attested  hn-conditionals cover  past counterfactuals. Certain aspects of the 
form and meaning of these conditionals are exemplified and discussed (with a 
focus on  P-clauses) in terms which aim to link relevant Egyptological work to 
linguistic work on conditionals.
The principal aim of this paper is to join up a particular thread of Egypto-
logical work on conditionals in Late Egyptian with relevant linguistic work on 
conditionals, and to present the material in a manner accessible to, and hope-
fully useful to, linguists. To narrow this topic down, this paper concentrates on 
Late Egyptian conditionals found in documentary texts, with a particular focus 
on conditionals from the two rich corpora of the later Tomb Robbery Papyri (TRP)1 
and the Late Ramesside Letters (LRL),2 both roughly contemporary, dating from 
the end of the Twentieth Dynasty at the end of the New Kingdom (ca. 1080–1070 
BCE).3 
*  My thanks to the three reviewers who provided comments on this paper.
1  The Tomb Robbery Papyri (TRP) cover a series of investigations towards the end of the Twen-
tieth Dynasty. The group I refer to as “later”, limited to those which provide examples of condi-
tionals, comprise: P. BM EA 10052 (year 1 of the “Renaissance”); P. Mayer A (= P. National Mu-
seums Liverpool M11162) (years 1–2 of the “Renaissance”), and P. BM EA 10403 (year 2 of the 
“Renaissance”). The “Renaissance” era is usually dated, on the basis of (partial) data from the 
Abbott dockets, as starting in regnal year 19 of Ramesses XI, the last Pharaoh of the Twentieth 
Dynasty. The papyri were published and translated in  Peet (1920) and Peet (1930).
2  The Late Ramesside Letters (LRL) centre on the two late Twentieth Dynasty Deir el-Medina 
scribes Dhutmose (who also appears in the later TRP) and his son Butehamun. The  Nubian group 
are dated to a year 10, usually considered to be of the “Renaissance” era (see  Wente 1967: 11–12), 
and thus stand close in time to the later TRP. The papyri were published in  Černý (1939), with 
comprehensive translation and commentary in Wente (1967), and with updated translations in 
Wente (1990). Further documents from the group have been published by  Janssen (1991, also 
including photographic plates of papyri transcribed in  Černý 1939) and  Demarée (2006).
3   Ancient Egyptian documents are typically dated by regnal years of the reigning Pharaoh (the 
use of an era such as the “Renaissance” era is exceptional). As such, Egyptologists usually refer 
to regnal year/era dates or, more generally, to collections (“dynasties”) of pharaohs (such as the 
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 Late Egyptian4 has three basic  conditional constructions,5 which can be iden-
tified by the three distinct introductory markers deployed (as well as by other 
grammatical features of the P-clause6 discussed below in the relevant section).7 
ỉr-conditional
The first type of conditional is introduced by ỉr:
(1) P. BM EA 10052, 9.3–48 ( Peet 1930: pl. 31):9
Context: The foreigner of the land survey Paykamen has been asked the 
standard opening interrogation question by the vizier ‘How did you set 
about getting into the great places?’, where ‘places’ refers to tombs. The 
example is Paykamen’s opening response to this question as framed by 
the scribe:
“Twentieth Dynasty”, ca. 1190–1070 BCE), or broad historical phases such as the “New Kingdom” 
(covering the Eighteenth to Twentieth Dynasties, ca. 1550–1100 BCE), rather than referring di-
rectly to absolute dates, which are approximate (and are here rounded).
4  The term “Late Egyptian” should be taken here to refer narrowly to the corpus as described 
and not simply to the broad phase of the language labelled “Late Egyptian”.
5  I restrict my attention to the three most well-attested  conditional constructions in Late Egyp-
tian in their most typical forms. There are, of course, other constructions which can display con-
ditional meaning in Late Egyptian, such as examples of imperative-conjunctive clauses with the 
standard paratactic conditional sense of “Wash my car and I will pay you five pounds”, as well 
as certain additional variants to the constructions discussed.
6  I use  P-clause to refer to the protasis =  antecedent of a conditional and  Q-clause to refer to the 
apodosis =  consequent of a conditional. In so doing I am following  Declerck &  Reed (2001a: 10).
7  In presenting these three initial examples, I have deliberately drawn the examples from the 
same  Ancient Egyptian text, P. BM EA 10052, in order to avoid issues of (broad)  diachrony, genre, 
or the like. The examples are also part of the written record of the opening responses by three 
different individuals to essentially the same interrogation question asked by the Vizier.
8  P. BM EA 10052 refers to the modern designation of the ancient source, here that of the Mu-
seum in which it is kept, so P. BM EA 10052 refers to “Papyrus British Museum, Department of 
Ancient Egypt and Sudan (formerly E[gyptian] A[ntiquities]) inventory number 10052”. The  stop 
and range notation in 9.3–4 is to be read “page 9, lines 3 to 4”.
9  Examples are presented in the following form: text reference; brief description of context; 
example presented utilising a standard variant of the transliteration system used in Egyptology 
(a system developed from a nineteenth century original, and so not strongly aligned with mod-
ern linguistic conventions); presentation of the example utilising the Leipzig Glossing Rules, 
including adaptions to  Ancient Egyptian to be found in  Di Biase-Dyson,  Kammerzell, &  Werning 
(2009); translation. 
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ỉr    ỉw10-tw   (ḥr)  gmt=ỉ     ỉw   ptrỉ=ỉ 
cond  sbrd-imprs [prs] find:inf=1sg sbrd see:pst=1sg
qdt  ḥḏ   qdt  nbw  m   nɜ    swt     ỉw-tw  (r)      ỉrt   
qite  silver qite gold  from  def:pl  places  fut-imprs [:fut] do:inf 
n=ỉ    sbɜyt      nbt  bỉn
dat=1sg  punishment  any terrible
‘If I am found to have seen a (single) qite of silver or gold from the Places, 
then any form of terrible punishment will be inflicted on me.’
 ỉnn-conditionals
The second type of conditional is introduced by ỉnn: 
(2) P. BM EA 10052, 8.5 ( Peet 1930: pl. 30):
Context: The servant Sekhahatyamun responds to essentially the same 
standard interrogation question by the vizier as in (1) above. He says he 
had nothing to do with the robberies from tombs at Thebes currently 
under investigation, and then adds the following, referring to earlier rob-
beries at Iumitru:
  ỉnn  ỉw-tw     (r)  ẖdb=ỉ           ḥr     nɜ 
  cond fut-imprs [:fut] kill:inf=1sg     because  def:pl 
  (m)aḥa(t) n  ỉw-(m)-ỉtrw mntw  n     wn=ỉ       ỉm 
  tomb   of Iumitru    3pl  def:pl be:rel:pst=1sg there
‘If I am going to be killed because of the Iumitru tombs,  then (at least) 
they are the ones which I’ve been in.’
10  There are separate grammatical elements represented graphically by ỉw in  Late Egyptian 
(although all are derived from the same original item in  earlier Egyptian): ỉw as a essential com-
ponent of the  third  future  tense; ỉw as a circumstantial clause marker, which is added to the basic 
tense/construction form, and so, for example, can be combined with the first present to produce 
the circumstantial first present; ỉw as an essential component of the sequential. Each of these 
constructions has distinctive negation as well as other distinctive grammatical characteristics. 
At first sight, particularly, when preposition markers of the infinitive are omitted (as they usu-
ally are in late Twentieth Dynasty documents) the P-clause form in exx. (1) and (2) may appear 
to be indistinct. However, negation and other grammatical features (e.g., the form with different 
tenses) do show them to be distinct. I assume such distinctions here, but the examples presented 
in the relevant sections below provide only illustrative (rather than comprehensive) material.
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 hn-conditional
The third type of conditional is introduced by hn:
(3) P. BM EA 10052, 4.13 ( Peet 1930: pl. 27):
Context: The trumpeter Amenkhau denies involvement in the robberies. 
He says bpy=ỉ ptr ḫt nbt ‘I didn’t see anything’, and then strengthens his 
denial with a counterfactual conditional:
hn   ptrỉ=ỉ
cond  see:pst=1sg
wn   ỉw=ỉ    (r)   ḏd=f
be:pst fut=1sg [:fut]  say:inf=3sg.m
‘If had seen (anything), I would say so.’
Each type will be discussed separately in the sections to follow.
1     ỉr-conditionals
1.1     ỉr-conditionals: on form
In the P-clause ỉr introduces a circumstantial clause marked by the general  Late 
Egyptian circumstantial/adverbial clause marker ỉw.11 The majority of attested 
examples display  ỉr + circumstantial first present, as in ex. (1) above, or as in ex. 
(4) here, whereas the Q -clause has standard main-clause form:
 ỉr + circumstantial fi rst present
(4) P. BM EA 75019+10302, vso 4 ( Demarée 2006: pl. 16):
Context: The sender of the letter is discussing certain items which the 
addressee has not had delivered. The sender reminds the addressee of 
an earlier letter in which the addressee had made a conditional promise: 
‘if you write again, I will have them sent to you’. The sender now calls in 
that promise. The quoted conditional promise is: 
11  For a recent discussion of the form of ỉw-clause in  P-clauses marked with ỉr, see  Kruchten 
(1997). On circumstantial ỉw, see, for example  Junge (2001: 189–195).
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ỉr    ỉw=k    (ḥr)  hɜb    an
cond  sbrd=2sg.m [prs] send:inf again
ỉw=ỉ    r    dỉt    ỉn-tw      n=k
fut=1sg :fut12  cause:inf bring:sbjv-indf dat=2sg.m
‘If you write again, I will have them sent to you.’
 ỉr-conditionals with circumstantial first present P -clauses provide the  Late Egyp-
tian equivalent of the  forward-looking conditional, in which the P-clause pres-
ents a possible but as yet unrealised event as a (pre-)condition for the realisation 
of the Q- clause. It will be noted that the P-clause shows something of the same 
“ tense-backstepping” feature of  English, although in Late Egyptian the P-clause 
form is explicitly marked as a dependent (circumstantial) clause.13
There are attested examples with circumstantial tenses other than the first 
present, although examples are limited in number:
 ỉr + circumstantial past14
(5) P. BM EA 10416, vso 11–12 ( Janssen 1991: pl. 17):
Context: A woman who has been sleeping with a man who is not her 
husband is under threat of violence. A steward has restrained those 
threatening violence once, but writes to the woman, pointing out the fol-
lowing:
yɜ   ỉr   ỉw   ỉ[n]ty(=ỉ)      sn  m  pɜy     sp
exlm cond sbrd restrain:pst=[1sg] 3pl in dem:m.sg occasion
bn   ỉw=ỉ    (r)   ỉnty=w       m  ky
neg  fut=1sg [:fut] restrain:inf=3pl  in another
‘Indeed, (even) if I have restrained them this time, I won’t restrain them 
another (time).’
12  The  Q-clause explicitly writes the distinctive  third  future r-prepositional marker of the infini-
tive. On the basis of such explicit writings (and also attested examples in ỉr-conditional Q-clauses 
of the distinctive  third  future negation), graphemically ambiguous ỉw=f inf Q-clauses without 
explicit preposition before the infinitive are usually taken to be third futures in Egyptology, al-
though there are certain examples which suggest that the sequential form may also be found in 
such Q-clauses. I do not discuss this issue here and gloss ỉw=f inf Q-clauses as third futures.
13  Compare  Declerck &  Reed (2001a: 124–125) on the “Present Perspective System”.
14  Two other examples, with damaged contexts, seem to have temporal meaning (‘once you 
have done something’; cf. discussion of ỉr below) rather than conditional meaning. Here I restrict 
my comments to this particular example and accept the conditional meaning of the concessive.
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 ỉr + circumstantial  third  future
(6) P. BM EA 10418+10287, rto 3–5 ( Janssen 1991: pl. 19):
Context: This short communiqué is probably connected to P. BM EA 10416 
(see ex. (5) above). The recto contains two recorded quotes, but with no 
specified connection. The second is:
ỉr   ỉw  bn   ỉw=n   (r)   gmt=s      r  qnqn=s 
cond sbrd neg  fut=1pl [:fut]  find:inf=3sg.f to  beat:inf=3sg.f
ỉw=n    (r)  gm    rtɜ   tɜy=s       snt   šrỉ, 
fut=1pl [:fut] find:inf Ruta poss:f.sg=3sg.f sister little
ỉw=n   (r)  gm    [...]-ỉs  gr,   ḫr=w
fut=1pl [:fut] find:inf […]is also, say=3pl
‘If we will not find her in order to beat her, we will find Ruta, her little 
sister, and we will find […]is also, so they say.’
Unfortunately, this is the only clearly attested example of the circumstantial  third 
 future in a P-clause in an ỉr-conditional, but with limited surviving context.
1.2  Comments on ỉr
ỉr is not just used in marking conditionals (and as such differs from ỉnn and hn, 
which are limited to conditional usage). ỉr is also regularly used to introduce a 
 left-dislocated topic/setting as the immediate context or ground for a following 
clause.15
15  Compare the discussion in Haiman (1978). Since I am concentrating here on using the three 
introductory lexemes ỉr, ỉnn, and hn to help distinguish the three  Late Egyptian conditional 
forms, I do not discuss here whether ỉr, ỉr + circumstantial ỉw, or just circumstantial ỉw is key to 
the conditional meaning of what I refer to as the ỉr-conditional. In the glosses, I gloss ỉr in con-
ditionals as “cond” for convenience and for immediate comparison with ỉnn and hn, allowing 
me to gloss circumstantial ỉw separately, whereas I gloss other uses of ỉr with ‘as-for’ or ‘when’. 
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ỉr + nominal phrase
(7) P. BM EA 10052, 4.24 ( Peet 1930: pl. 28):16
Context: The slave Degay is interrogated for a second day, as part of 
extensive testimony he gives concerning his owner, a key thief Bukhaaf. 
He opens with the following, and then lists a series of names:
ỉr   pɜ    mɜat nty ỉw=ỉ   (r)   ḏd=f
as-for def:m.sg truth rel fut=1sg [:fut]  say:inf=3sg.m
bn  dḏ(=ỉ)     rmṯ   nb  ỉptr=ỉ       ỉ-r-m 
neg  say:sbjv=[1sg] person every see:rel:pst=1sg  with
bw-ḫɜa=f
Bukhaaf
‘As for the truth which I’m going to tell, I may not be able to name every-
one who I saw with Bukhaaf.’
ỉr + prepositional phrase17
(8) P. BM EA 10054, 2.4 ( Peet 1930: pl. 6):
Context: The fisherman Panakhtemope confesses to having ferried 
thieves across the river to the west bank at Thebes (where the tombs are) 
a number of times. He relates the first episode and then moves on to the 
second, starting as follows (‘they’ refers to the thieves):
ḫr  ỉr    n  rwhɜ  n  hrw 2
Then as_for in evening of day 2
ỉw=w    (ḥr)   ỉỉ
cord=3pl  [:cord] come:inf
‘Then (as for) in the evening of the second day, they came.’
ỉr is also used to mark two other forms of  subordinate clauses, both with temporal 
meaning:
16  Usually, the ỉr-marked nominal expression is resumed pronominally in the following clause; 
however, as this example shows, this does not have to be the case. As such, ỉr-marking is akin to 
the pairing “As for Paris, most visitors consider it a wonderful city” and “As for Paris, the Eiffel 
tower is a must-see tourist attraction”.
17  No example of this construction happens to appear in P. BM EA 10052. P. BM EA 10054 is 
another papyrus from the TRP, usually dated a generation or so earlier.
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ỉr + m-ḏr sḏm=f
(9) P. BM EA 10052, 10.18 ( Peet 1930: pl. 31):
Context: The slave Paynekhu describes how he came to be owned by the 
accused thieves, a husband and wife. Paynekhu first recounts:
ỉr   m-ḏr ḫfy     pɜy-nḥsy ḥrdw
as-for when destroy:pst Paynehsy Hardai
ỉw   ms-nḥsy    bw-thɜ-ỉmn (ḥr)   ỉnt(=ỉ)
cord young-Nubian Butehamun [:cord] take:inf=1sg
‘When Paynehsy destroyed Hardai, the young Nubian Butehamun took 
me.’
(ḫr) ỉr + fi rst present/ past  tense
The other principal construction with ỉr in  Late Egyptian is a  temporal correla-
tive construction in which ỉr, or more commonly ḫr  ỉr, is followed by the form 
known as the “first present” (here with past time reference) or, more rarely, the 
 past tense (with  pluperfect time reference) in a temporal clause (‘when’) to a fol-
lowing clause in which the tense-form is restricted to the sequential. The first 
present and  past tense in the (ḫr) ỉr clause do not take the  circumstantial marker 
ỉw and appear in the same form as in independent main clauses:
(10)  P. BM EA 10052, 10.19–20 ( Peet 1930: pl. 31):
Context: Following on from ex. (9) above, the slave Paynekhu recounts 
that he was bought from Butehamun by the foreigner Pentasekhnu, 
after which (the ‘him’ in the following example refers to Pentasekhnu):
ḫr  ỉr   tw-tw    (ḥr)  ẖdb=f
Then when prs18-imprs [:prs] kill:inf=3sg
ỉw   kɜry   kɜr (ḥr)   ỉnt=ỉ     (r) swn(t)=ỉ
cord gardener Kar [:cord] take:inf=1sg [at] price=1sg
‘Then, when he was killed, the gardener Kar bought me at my price.’
18  The  Late Egyptian first present (in its basic form) with pronoun subject shows (for first and 
second person pronouns singular and plural, and also the impersonal suffix -tw) a pronoun form 
with a pronominal prefixed base tw=. Circumstantial ỉw and past wn with the first present take the 
pronoun subject directly as a suffix pronoun and do not co-occur with the pronominal prefix base.
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1.3     ỉr-conditionals: on meaning
Conditionals are a key means of coping with uncertainties, with things not fully 
settled. As a backdrop to this paper, I adopt here a subjective probability approach 
to the understanding of conditionals, a major thread in recent philosophical work 
on conditionals. As such, in conditionals the Q- clause is not entertained indepen-
dently but conditionally on the supposition of P as ‘Q given P’.19 Languages, of 
course, tend to mark the P-clause based on features of how it is being entertained. 
In Late Egyptian it seems that P-clause marking reflects the relationship of the 
P-clause epistemically to the  actuality, and temporally to the present, of the use-
context,20 and it is here that I shall mostly concentrate my attention. 
By meaning, as already noted, the ỉr-conditional provides the typical form of 
forward-looking situational conditional. That is, the P-clause provides a condition 
which requires the outcome of  future events to be fulfilled (as such the condition 
covers events which are both subjectively uncertain to the user and addressee of 
the conditional and objectively uncertain in terms of the temporality of events in 
the world). The Q- clause is to be realised or activated on realisation of the P-clause, 
and thus again awaits the unfolding of events. As such, the P-clause provides the 
hypothetical contextual ground in (or mental space/possible world from) which 
the further realisation of the Q- clause situation is projected. Consider again ex. (1):
(11)=(1) P. BM EA 10052, 9.3–4:
Context: The foreigner of the land survey Paykamen has been asked 
the standard opening interrogation question by the vizier ‘How did you 
set about getting into the great places?’, where ‘places’ is used to refer 
19  In terms of probability logic, the  conditional probability of (Q given P) is equal to the ratio 
of the probability of (P&Q) and the probability of P (the Ratio formula π(Q|P) = p(P&Q)/p(P), for 
p(P) > 0, where, following  Bennett 2003: 51, “π” refers to  conditional probability and “p” to un-
conditional probability). For discussion of probabilistic approaches to conditionals (particularly 
in terms of degrees of belief), and of the Ramsey Test, see  Edgington (1995: 259–270, 2003, 2005), 
and the general account in Bennett (2003: 28–33, 45–59). This draws on the standard Bayesian 
account of  conditional probability, and allows for connection to work in Cognitive Psychology; 
see, for example,  Oaksford &  Chater (2007: chapter 5). Just one thing to note in the current con-
text: the probabilistic approach makes active use only of the assumption of the stated P (which 
can have positive or negative polarity, of course), and does not make active use of the unstated 
not-P (the “bet”, as it were, is cancelled or void if the stated P is false). This seems to me to link 
up nicely to the exploitation of a (defeasible) conversational implicature approach to the use of 
negated P in reading  conditional perfection into conditionals (see below).
20  I use use-context generally to cover person-to-person linguistic interaction both in speech 
and in letter exchanges (where the user and recipient are, of course, divorced in space and time). 
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to tombs. The example is Paykamen’s opening response to this ques-
tion as framed by the scribe:
ỉr   ỉw-tw    (ḥr)  gmt=ỉ     ỉw   ptrỉ=ỉ 
cond sbrd-imprs [prs] find:inf=1sg sbrd see:pst=1sg
qdt  ḥḏ   qdt   nbw m   nɜ    swt    ỉw-tw   
qite silver qite  gold from  def:pl  places fut-imprs  
(r)    ỉrt   n=ỉ    sbɜyt      nbt  bỉn
[:fut] do:inf  dat=1sg  punishment  any  terrible
‘If I am found to have seen a (single) qite of silver or gold from the Places, 
then any form of terrible punishment will (surely) be inflicted on me.’
In the use-context, the status of Paykamen being found to have seen the silver 
and gold is objectively (and thus also subjectively) uncertain and awaits the 
unfolding of events to be realised or not. It is thus dependent on the temporal-
ity of occurrence (the event of the P-clause actually happening or not), as can be 
seen by taking the conditional out of context and artificially strengthening the 
meaning towards certainty through ‘when’ as in ‘when I am found to have seen 
silver and gold from the places, any form of punishment will be inflicted on me’. 
The majority of attested examples of  ỉr-conditionals in the corpus under study are 
forward-looking conditionals of this type. 
There are also examples in which the P-clause is an imagined alternative 
state of affairs (present counterfactual) as a (counterfactual mental space/pos-
sible world) immediate context within which to couch the Q- clause:21
21  As in  Iatridou (2000), the term “present counterfactual” refers to the P-clause being a coun-
terfact to, or in conflict with, the current state of affairs (although potentially still realisable), 
rather than to features of  tense-marking. Of course, the usual caveats on the term “counterfac-
tual” apply. 
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(12)  P. Paris Bibl. Nat. 198, II (LRL no. 46), vso 6–7 ( Černý 1939: 68.9–10):
Context: The letter writer shows, as he has done regularly through his 
letter, his disgruntlement with the intended recipient:
ỉr   ỉw=k      m  ṯɜty 
cond sbrd=2sg.m  as vizier
bn   ỉw=ỉ    (r)   hɜy         r    nɜy=k      skty
neg  fut=1sg [:fut]  descend:inf into  poss:pl=2sg.m boat
‘(Even) If you were the vizier, I wouldn’t get into your boats.’
Although  Late Egyptian has no specific marker for counterfactual or epistemic 
distancing in constructions of this type (it does not use past- tense marking, for 
example), the imaginary nature of certain  ỉr-conditionals, particularly those 
with P -clauses with non-verbal constructions (that is, with no equivalent of the 
verb ‘to be’ in the Late Egyptian pattern), and thus referring to non-dynamic 
situations, is clear enough by sense. I will return to the concessive reading of 
this conditional below.
Example 5 above, with ỉr ỉw + past sḏm=f in the P-clause presents an example 
of the conditional assertion of a Q- clause based on a P-clause in which the situ-
ation in the P-clause is accepted as having occurred (and again has concessive 
sense):
(13)=(5) P. BM EA 10416, vs. 11–12 ( Janssen 1991: pl. 17):
Context: A woman who has been sleeping with a man who is not her 
husband is under threat of violence. A steward has restrained those 
threatening violence once, but writes to the woman, pointing out the 
following:
yɜ    ỉr    ỉw   ỉ[n]ty(=ỉ)       sn   m  pɜy  
exlm  cond  sbrd restrain:pst=[1sg]  3pl  in dem:m.sg 
sp     bn   ỉw=ỉ    (r)    ỉnty=w       m  ky
occasion  neg  fut=1sg [:fut]  restrain:inf=3pl  in another
‘Indeed, (even) if I have restrained them this time, I won’t restrain them 
another (time).’
Across these usages, the P -clauses of  ỉr-conditionals seem to be distanced, or 
excluded or projected away, from the ‘now’ of the use-context, whether tem-
porally and/or epistemically, and in the P-clause there is alignment between 
subjective epistemic evaluation (the perspective of an individual’s knowledge 
in terms of evidence available) and the objective state of affairs, at least as 
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that is accepted or is thought to be knowable (in contrast with  ỉnn-conditional 
P -clauses, which directly relate to the ‘now’ of the use-context, and for which 
a distinction between subjective knowledge and the objective state of affairs is 
significant; see below). So, the forward-looking P-clause with circumstantial 
first present awaits the outcome of  future events and is objectively unknowable 
or unverifiable ‘now’ (and is, of course, therefore subjectively unknowable as 
well); P -clauses with circumstantial non-verbal predications present imaginary 
or present counterfactual P -clauses, a P-clause which is distanced epistemically 
from  actuality and accepted as a counterfact; the P-clause with a circumstantial 
past provides a closed condition – an accepted past occurrence.
1.4   From  conditional perfection to concessive readings of 
 ỉr-conditionals
As already noted, some of the examples above readily allow a  concessive meaning 
(and can be translated as ‘even if’), although there is no specific marker for  con-
cessive conditionals in  Late Egyptian. This can be addressed by looking at mean-
ing-construction in context for Late Egyptian  ỉr-conditionals, which, as might be 
expected, show a range of pragmatic effects from, on the one hand, a tendency 
to the exclusive reading of the P-clause as a condition for the realisation of the 
Q- clause ( conditional perfection) through, on the other hand, to examples in 
which the P-clause is read as an inclusive, limiting condition for the realisation of 
the Q- clause, particularly in the context of constructed pragmatic scales.
1.4.1   Conditional perfection  
Forward-looking conditionals are those which most readily lend themselves to 
“ conditional perfection”: the tendency to perfect a conditional into an “if and 
only if” conditional.22 The P. BM EA 10052 9.3–4 example of an ỉr-conditional 
readily lends itself to a  conditional perfection reading:
22  The discussion here draws on  Horn (2000), who treats  conditional perfection in terms of 
conversational implicature (R-based pragmatic strengthening).
Authenticated | m.a.collier@liverpool.ac.uk author's copy
Download Date | 1/17/15 10:57 AM
 Conditionals in Late Egyptian   169
 (14)=(1) P. BM EA 10052, 9.3–4 ( Peet 1930: pl. 31):
Context: The foreigner of the land survey Paykamen has been asked 
the standard opening interrogation question by the vizier ‘How did 
you set about getting into the great places?’, where ‘places’ refers to 
tombs. The example is Paykamen’s opening response to this question 
as framed by the scribe:
ỉr    ỉw-tw     (ḥr)  gmt=ỉ     ỉw   
cond  sbrd-imprs  [prs] find:inf=1sg sbrd 
ptrỉ=ỉ      qdt   ḥḏ   qdt   nbw  m   nɜ    swt         
see:pst=1sg  qite  silver qite  gold  from def:pl places  
ỉw-tw     (r)   ỉrt    n=ỉ     sbɜyt      nbt  bỉn
fut-imprs [:fut]  do:inf  dat=1sg  punishment  any  terrible
‘If I am found to have seen a (single) qite of silver or gold from the 
Places, then any form of terrible punishment will be inflicted on me.’
Using  English as a metalanguage, the  conditional perfection reading emerges as 
follows:
(15)  ‘If I can be found to have seen a (single) qite of silver or gold from the 
Places, then any form of terrible punishment will be inflicted on me.’
‘If I cannot be found to have seen a (single) qite of silver or gold from 
the Places, then any form of terrible punishment will not be inflicted 
on me.’
‘If and only if I can be found to have seen a (single) qite of silver or gold 
from the Places, then any form of terrible punishment will be inflicted 
on me.’
This seems admirably suited to the context of Paykamen’s defiant response. In 
inviting the possibility that if he is found guilty then punishment will surely 
befall him, he is opening the unstated  conditional perfection inference that if it 
turns out that he is not found to have seen the silver and gold from the tombs, 
he should not be punished and thus the exclusivity of the relationship between 
guilt and punishment that punishment should befall him if and only if he is 
found to have seen the silver and gold from the tombs.
In terms of sufficient and necessary conditions, standard forward-looking 
 ỉr-conditionals thus include clear examples which allow, in context, an implica-
ture strengthening the P-clause from being a sufficient condition to be capable of 
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being entertained (at least in practical terms) as a necessary and sufficient, and 
thus exclusive, condition.
1.4.2   Concessive Conditionals
(16)=(12) P. Paris Bibl. Nat. 198, II (LRL no. 46), vso 6–7 ( Černý 1939: 68.9–10):
Context: The letter writer shows, as he has done regularly through his 
letter, his disgruntlement with the intended recipient:
ỉr    ỉw=k      m  ṯɜty 
cond  sbrd=2sg.m  as vizier
bn   ỉw=ỉ    (r)   hɜy        r    nɜy=k      skty
neg  fut=1sg [:fut]  descend:inf into  poss:pl=2sg.m boat
‘(Even) If you were the vizier, I wouldn’t get into your boats.’
The P. Paris Bib. Nat. 198 II, vso 6–7 example does not allow  conditional 
perfection:23 ‘*if and only if you were vizier, I would not get into your boats’ 
seems a quite wrong pragmatic strengthening of this example. That is, the 
P-clause does not lend itself to being read as an exclusive condition. In addition, 
the Q- clause, rather than being realised as a consequence of the realisation of 
the P-clause, holds independently of the P-clause: the imagery of ‘I will not get 
into your boats’ holds also as a comment on the addressee right now and not 
just in the imaginary situation of the addressee being vizier. So, the counter-
factual P-clause provides just one context for the realisation of the Q- clause, a 
context which also includes the actual state of affairs. There is also a scalar effect 
through which the P-clause provides a limiting condition on the Q- clause. That 
is, the user of the conditional is implying that he wouldn’t get into the recipient’s 
boat (as an idiom for agreeing with his point of view) as things stand, and that 
would remain the case right up to and including if the recipient had the powerful 
status of vizier.
Although there is no formal expression of concessivity in the P-clause, 
nevertheless the scalar reading can be readily constructed. The recipient does 
not in fact hold the position of vizier and so a counterpart relationship is being 
projected for the addressee, linking his actual standing with the hypothetical 
23  A widely recognised feature of  concessive conditionals, cf.  König (1986: 235–239) for a dis-
cussion covering territory similar to the discussion here.
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positing of him being vizier. This counterpart relationship is scaled or ranked 
pragmatically into a partially ordered set24 ranging from the addressee as he is 
to what Ekkehard  König termed a “pseudo-superlative” as a limiting term in the 
scale,25 here the powerful position of vizier (presumably also covering a host 
of unstated intermediary positions in between?). As such, the Q- clause is inter-
preted not just in the case of the P-clause as formally expressed, but in relation 
to the constructed scalar range and so the Q- clause is applicable not just in the 
hypothetical circumstance of the addressee being vizier, but to the addressee as 
he currently is right up the scale to him being vizier. The P-clause thus meets the 
criterion noted by  Haspelmath &  König (1998: 565) for scalar  concessive condi-
tionals that such  concessive conditionals relate not a single P-clause, but a set of 
P -clauses, to a Q- clause, here a set established by implicature.
2     ỉnn-conditionals
The second type of conditional is the  ỉnn-conditional. Here example 2 is repeated:
(17)=(2) P. BM EA 10052, 8.5 ( Peet 1930: pl. 30):
Context: The servant Sekhahatyamun responds to essentially the same 
standard interrogation question by the vizier as in (1) above. He says he 
had nothing to do with the robberies from tombs at Thebes currently 
under investigation, and then adds the following, referring to earlier 
robberies at Iumitru:
ỉnn  ỉw-tw       (r)  ẖdb=ỉ    ḥr     nɜ   (m)aḥa(t) n 
cond fut-imprs [:fut] kill:inf=1sg  because  def:pl  tomb   of
ỉw-(m)-ỉtrw   mntw   nɜ    wn=ỉ       ỉm 
Iumitru     3pl   def:pl be:rel:pst=1sg there
‘If I am going to be killed because of the Iumitru tombs,  then (at least) 
they are the ones which I’ve been in.’
24  I refer to pragmatic scales in the sense of  Fauconnier (1975), and Posets as in  Hirschberg 
(1991). For scalar approaches to  concessive conditionals, see, for example,  König (1986),  Kay 
(1990/1997) (on ‘even’),  Haspelmath &  König (1998),  Declerck &  Reed (2001b: 217–230), and  Iten 
(2005: 217–233).
25   König (1986: 236).
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2.1     ỉnn-conditionals: on form
The P-clause is formed by the introductory marker ỉnn26 followed by a clause 
which has the same form and meaning (including time reference) as the equiva-
lent independent main clause without ỉnn; the Q- clause has standard main-clause 
form. Examples are provided here for past, present, and  future:27
 ỉnn +  past  tense (here the specifi c negation of the past)
(18)  P. BM EA 10100 (LRL no. 30), rto 14–15 ( Černý 1939: 50.16–51.2):
Context: The sender is discussing 5 serving-women he has allocated to 
the workmen, commenting that they are for the service of all the work-
gang (with the exception, apparently, of Heramunpenaf). However, the 
sender is unsure whether the serving-women have actually arrived and 
so provides guidance for this eventuality:
ḫr   ỉnn  bwpw=tn    šsp=w
cord cond neg:pst=2pl receive:inf=3pl
ỉw=tn   (r)   šm    r   pɜ     nty  ḥr-r-t  
fut=2pl [:fut]  go:inf to  def:m.sg  rel Hereret 
ỉm   mtw=tn     šsp=w     n=s
there cord.mod=2pl receive:inf=3pl from=3sg.f
‘But if you haven’t received them, you should go to Hereret [lit. to where 
Hereret is] and get them from her.’
26  There have been differing proposals for the etymology of ỉnn, but the most likely proposal 
(see, e.g.,  Depuydt 1991) is that it comes from the  earlier Egyptian combination ỉr wnn (examples 
still to be found in  Late Egyptian), one of the attested uses of which is to mark epistemic condi-
tional usage. If so, the epistemic usage has grammaticalized out by Late Egyptian, as so often 
cross-linguistically.
27  Further examples, across a wider range of  tenses and constructions, are provided in  Collier 
(2006).
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 ỉnn + fi rst present
(19)  O. Berlin P 12630, vso 1–2 (Deir el-Medine on-line):28
Context: A letter of complaint over non-payment by the recipient for a 
coffin and bed which the sender has previously provided. After resum-
ing the history the debt briefly, the sender ends:
ỉnn  tw=t    ḥr  dỉt    pɜ     ỉḥ  
cond prs=2sg.f  prs  give:inf  def.m.sg  ox  
ỉmỉ      ỉn-tw=f
cause:imp  bring:sbjv-imprs=3sg.m
ḫr   ỉnn  mn     ỉḥ  ỉmỉ      ỉn-tw  
cord cond neg.exis ox cause:imp bring.sbjv-imprs  
pɜ      ḥatỉ   ḥna  pɜ     wt
def.m.sg  bed  and  def.m.sg  coffin
‘If you can provide the ox, have it sent; but if there is no ox, have the 
bed and coffin returned.’
 ỉnn +  third  future (see also ex. (17)=(2) above)
(20)  P. Mayer B (= P. National Museums Liverpool M11186), 4–5 ( Peet 1920: 
pl. P. Mayer B):29
Context: The thief Pais is attempting to coerce his way into a share of a 
robbery undertaken by other thieves. He does so by using a conditional 
threat to inform on the thieves to (the people of) the governor of the 
west (of Thebes) and the inspectors (the transliteration of this lengthy 
phrase is omitted and replaced with NN).
ỉr    nɜ    ḥd   ỉgm=k 
as-for  def:pl silver find:rel:pst=2sg.m
ỉnn   bn   ỉw=k     (r)   dỉt     n=ỉ    ỉm=w
cond neg  fut=2sg.m [:fut] give:inf  dat=1sg from=3pl
28  The ostracon is usually dated to the mid-Twentieth Dynasty (reigns of Ramesses III–Ramesses 
IV), so around about 70–80 years before TPR and LRL; see the Deir el-Medina Database web-site.
29  P. Mayer B is a single page fragment. It concerns the robbery from the tomb of the mid-Twen-
tieth Dynasty pharaoh Ramesses VI, and so cannot be too far in time from the other TPR.
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ỉw=ỉ    (r)    šm    r  ḏd=f       n   NN
fut=1sg [:fut]  go:inf to tell:inf=3sg.m  dat  NN
‘As for the monies which you have found, if you are not going to give 
me (anything) from them, then I will go to tell it to NN.’
2.2    ỉnn-conditionals: on meaning
The  ỉnn-conditional deals with conditional current subjective knowledge about 
P-clause situations which themselves may be in the past, present, or  future – 
the P-clause is presented as being subjectively uncertain (usually uncertain to 
the user, whether in fact or as a rhetorical ploy), and the Q- clause (an assertion, 
an instruction, a question) is put on supposition of this subjectively uncertain 
P-clause.30 For P- clauses with past or present  tense, whether or not the P-clause 
accurately characterises the situation referred to in the P-clause is, in objective 
terms, open to confirmation (fact-checking):31 the formulation in the P-clause is 
either a true or false characterisation of matters as they stand, and the relevant 
evidence is, in principle, potentially available (already or through checking) to 
someone (usually the addressee to whom the conditional is put).32 Future-oriented 
P- clauses primarily concern current predictions of the course of events and, based 
on the prediction, can allow for the pre-emption of the  future outcome of those 
events by realisation of the Q- clause ahead of, or separate from, the outcome of 
those events.33 Such conditionals can be glossed with ‘if it is true/the case that’ 
and the epistemic meaning of the P-clause of the  ỉnn-conditional can often be 
30  See  Haegeman (2003: 319–320) for a sample listing of authors who have distinguished two 
sorts of “if-clauses” along what seem to be similar lines as the distinction between ỉr- and  ỉnn-
conditionals here, although there seem to be issues at the level of detail (see, for example,  Edg-
ington (2003: 394–396) for critical comments on deploying causality as a means of distinguish-
ing a class of conditionals), and on whether terminologies and analyses apply to  P-clauses or 
connections between P- and Q-clauses (such as  Sweetser 1990’s influential distinction between 
“content”, “epistemic”, and “speech-act” conditionals). My usage has a lineage within Egyptol-
ogy which stretches back to work by the linguist and Copticist Wolf-Peter  Funk (cf. Funk 1985; 
and also  Depuydt 1999, who grounds his work in that of  Boole), albeit that my account differs 
in detail. 
31  Egyptologists have often noted that the P-clause in such a conditional overlaps in its prop-
erties with yes/no questions; see, for example,  Junge (2001: 266). Compare  Declerck &  Reed 
(2001a: 91–92). 
32  Cf. particularly  Funk (1985: 375–376) and  Kaufmann (2005: 186).
33  Cf.  Nieuwint (1986);  Dancygier (1998: 116–120); Dancygier &  Sweetser (2005: 87–89).
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brought out by taking the conditional out of context and artificially strengthening 
towards certainty through using ‘since’ or ‘because’. Thus example (17)=(2) can 
be strengthened to (in this example this also happens to work in context):
(21)   ‘Since I am going to be killed because of the Iumitru tombs, then (at 
least) they are the ones I’ve been in.’
Ordinarily in  ỉnn-conditionals, there is presumed to be a distinction, or asym-
metry, in the subjective knowledge of the user and addressee of the conditional. 
Most commonly, users position themselves as being currently uncertain about 
the P-clause, and then follow through with a Q- clause based on supposition of 
the P-clause; the user seems ordinarily to expect the addressee to have a clearer 
body of knowledge about the P-clause situation and thus to be able to activate the 
Q- clause or not on the basis of this knowledge (e.g., to accept or reject an asser-
tion, to carry out an instruction, to answer a question). Of course, as in  English, 
users can adopt this stance as a rhetorical ploy, e.g., as a means to guide the 
addressee towards a particular conclusion. See ex. 22 below.
 ỉnn-conditionals can have P- clauses which can be read counterfactually, or 
epistemically distanced (higher degree of hypotheticality), as something which 
is offered up as being possible but which, in the following example, can be ruled 
out, although there is no explicit marking of unlikelihood or  counterfactuality:
(22)  P. BM EA 10375 (LRL no. 28), vso 1 ( Černý 1939: 46.16–47.1):
Context: The scribe Butehamun is stressing to the general Payankh, 
his lord, that the workgang are carrying out all the tasks of the lord as 
diligently as they can even in the face of problems. He reinforces this 
with the following conditional claiming that they would inform the 
general were they not (and Payankh can see for himself that they are 
not informing the lord of this in their letter – just the opposite).
ỉnn   bn   ỉ-ỉr=n     bɜk     n=k   
cond neg  thmz=1pl  work:inf dat=2sg.m 
m   ỉb      ḥɜty=n 
with heart-force heart=1pl
ỉw=n   (r)  hɜb    r   dỉt      am  
fut=1pl [:fut] send:inf to cause:inf  know:sbjv 
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pɜy=n      nb
poss:m.sg=1pl lord
‘If we were not working for your heart and soul, we would write to let 
our lord know.’
This is an example of an  ỉnn-conditional deployed by the user to try to steer the 
addressee towards a particular view: the content of the P-clause is not subjectively 
uncertain to the user, but is subjectively uncertain to the addressee. Butehamun 
obviously has a clear stance on whether the workmen are working heart and soul 
for their general (whether a truthful stance or not). He presents a conditional in 
which the general can reason out (by modus tollens reasoning) an answer to this 
for himself (or at least reason out Butehamun’s version of the answer) based on 
the conditional as presented. 
3     hn-conditionals
Finally, the third type of conditional is the  hn-conditional:
(23)=(3) P. BM EA 10052, 4.13 ( Peet 1930: pl. 27):
Context: The trumpeter Amenkhau denies involvement in the robber-
ies. He says bpy=ỉ ptr ḫt nbt ‘I didn’t see anything’, and then strength-
ens his denial with a counterfactual conditional:
hn   ptrỉ=ỉ
cond  see:pst=1sg
wn    ỉw=ỉ    (r)   ḏd=f
be:pst fut=1sg [:fut]  say:inf=3sg.m
‘If had seen (anything), I would say so.’
This example expresses past  counterfactual conditional meaning. The term 
“counterfactual” has, of course, come under criticism, even for patterns of this 
sort,34 and examples exist from well-studied languages, such as  English, in which 
the relevant P-clause  tense-marking pattern need not have strictly counterfac-
tual meaning. However, counterfactual meaning is typical, even if this is prag-
matic and not essential, and, for  Late Egyptian, the range of attested examples 
34  For example,  Comrie (1986: 89–91).
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do display past counterfactual meaning, whereas the type of example which 
might show whether this pattern necessarily expresses  counterfactuality or not is 
lacking from the available dataset.
3.1     hn-conditionals: on form
The P-clause is formed by the marker hn followed by the ordinary  past  tense 
(the  past sḏm=f form as in ex. (23) above). Examples can also be found in which 
the  past  tense carries a further  past tense marker (thus providing a “ pluperfect” 
tense-form). For example, the counterfactual strengthening of denial found in ex. 
(23) occurs a number of times across the written versions of the testimonies in the 
later TPR, including the following variant from P. BM EA 10403:
(24)  P. BM EA 10403, 3.29 ( Peet 1930: pl. 37):
Context: The townswoman Shedehnakhte denies seeing anything to do 
with the thefts during the time she worked in the house of the accused 
thief Tetisheri. She says bpy=ỉ ptr ‘I didn’t see (anything)’ and then 
strengthens this with the following counterfactual conditional:
hn    wn     ptr=ỉ 
cond  aux:pst  see:pst=1sg
wn    ỉw=ỉ    (r)   ḏd=f
be:pst fut=1sg [:fut]  say:inf=3sg.m
‘If I had seen, I would say so.’
Returning to the general form of the  hn-conditional, the Q- clause (here a coun-
terfactual Q- clause) also shows distinctive marking, being composed of the  third 
 future (ỉw=f r sḏm, which has the specific negation bn ỉw=f r sḏm) preceded by the 
past marker wn. The past marker wn appears in all surviving examples of counter-
factual Q-clauses with the  third  future and so appears not to be optional (so wn 
ỉw=f r sḏm, with the specific negation wn bn ỉw=f r sḏm); see also ex. 26 below. 
In fact, the wn +  third  future construction can be used outside of conditionals to 
express a counterfactual state of affairs:35
35  For forms marked both for “potentiality” and “past” as the most common forms for single-
clause counterfactual constructions, see  Van Linden &  Verstraete (2008: esp. 1870–1872).
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(25)  P. Turin 2021, rto 3.4 ( Allam 1973a: 117):36
Context: The priest Amenkhau states that he is providing for his second 
wife Anksunedjem, and also that he is providing for his children from 
a previous marriage. In particular, they are not omitted from anything 
which he brought in with their mother. He then adds the following, 
after which he notes that he is precluded by the word of Pharaoh from 
doing this:
ỉw   wn    ỉw=ỉ    (r)   dỉt     n=w    m   pɜ 
sbrd be:pst fut=1sg [:fut]  give:inf  dat=3pl from  def:m.sg 
ỉn=ỉ         ỉ-r-m  anḫ-n-nwt    ỉnk-sw-nḏm
bring:rel:pst=1sg  with townswoman Anksunedjem
‘I would give them from what I have brought in with the townswoman 
Anksunedjem.’
3.2     hn-conditionals: on meaning
As already noted, the  hn-conditional covers the core ground of past counter-
factual conditionals – the positing of an alternate P-clause past state of affairs 
from that which did obtain as a condition for the realisation of the Q- clause. In 
attested examples in documentary texts, the counterfactual P-clause differs only 
in limited particulars from  actuality,37 and the  hn-conditional is deployed for its 
contribution to the current discourse, which is usually centred on  actuality, thus 
with interplay between  counterfactuality and  (f) actuality. For example:
36  P. Turin 2021, with additional fragments P. Geneva D409, dates to the late Twentieth Dynasty 
(and mentions certain individuals, such as the Deir el-Medina scribe Dhutmose, known from 
both the later TPR and the LRL). For transcription and photographs, see  Allam (1973a: 112–119); 
for  German translation, see  Allam (1973b: 320–327).
37  The limited or constrained alteration to  actuality in order to construct the counterfactual 
space reflects something of the (admittedly more stringent) conditions on closest possible world 
discussed at length and in detail in the philosophical literature, a discussion going back to Lewis 
(1973). See  Bennett (2003: chapters 10–16) and  Edgington (2008) for recent discussions.
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(26)  Wenamun (P. Pushkin Museum 120), 2.29–30 ( Gardiner 1932: 69.15–16):38
Context: The ruler of Byblos Tjekerbaal has pointed out to the Egyp-
tian representative Wenamun that previous Egyptian rulers used to 
pay for the timber provided from the Lebanon for the sacred bark of 
Amun. Wenamun counters by asserting that everything belongs to the 
god Amun. He then takes up the point about earlier rulers. ‘As for your 
saying that previous rulers used to have silver and gold sent, if they 
had had life and health, they would not have had these things sent. 
They did send these things — but only instead of life and health — to 
your ancestors. But Amen-Re King of the Gods, he is the master of life 
and health’.
hn    wn-(m)-dỉ=w   anḫ  snb,
cond  pst-poss39=3pl life  health
wn    bn   ỉw=w    (r)   dỉt      ỉn-tw   
be:pst neg  fut=3pl [:fut]  cause:inf  bring:sbjv-imprs 
nɜ    ɜḫt 
def:pl things
‘If they had had life and health, they would not have had these things 
[= gold and silver] sent.’
Here Wenamun points out that previous rulers of Egypt had to pay because 
they were not the determiners of life and health, as part of his point that he, 
Wenamun, is a representative of the god Amun, not of a temporal ruler, and the 
god is the determiner of life and health. In the conditional, a counterpart for 
the previous rulers is projected into a counterfactual space and assigned the 
(counterfactual) property of the ability to determine life and health, and then 
the consequence of this altered state of affairs is explored based on this supposi-
38  The Report of Wenamun (a modern title) is a literary text (or at the very least an embellished 
literary version of a report), and probably dates a good few decades or more later than other 
material dealt with in this paper. However, it has long been recognised in Egyptology that the 
form of its language finds close parallel in late Twentieth Dynasty documentary  Late Egyptian. 
For publication of hieroglyphic transcription, see Gardiner (1932); for photographs of the origi-
nal hieratic, see the end plates to  Schipper (2005); for recent  English translation, see  Wente in 
 Simpson (2003: 116–124); for arguments for a dating to the mid-Twenty-first Dynasty to early 
Twenty-second Dynasty, see  Winand (2011).
39  The possession construction in this example is comprised of the auxiliary wn followed by 
a prepositional phrase meaning etymologically ‘in the hand of’. See  Černý &  Groll (1975/1993: 
395) for brief discussion of time indication with the possession construction.
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tion – that they would not have had to pay. Wenamun then returns to  actuality 
within which space he asserts that Amun is the master of life and health (and 
thus has counterpart properties to the counterfactual P-clause). He thus implies 
(on the basis of a scalar ranking with Amun ranking above temporal rulers) that 
the stated consequence in the counterfactual should hold for Amun in “factual” 
space (without explicitly having to state that this is so):40
Factual Counterfactual Factual
Previous rulers Previous rulers The god Amun
- control life and health + control life and health + control life and health
+ Pay for timber - Pay for timber (- Pay for timber)
4   Conclusion
The three different conditional patterns in  Late Egyptian have distinctive forms 
and meanings, in which P-clause marking is key. In the ỉr-conditional, the 
P-clause is distanced from the  actuality of the use-context and subjective, and 
objective (un)certainty are not distinguished: forward-looking P- clauses await 
the outcome of the  future course of events; present time-reference P- clauses are 
accepted as counterfactual; past P- clauses are accepted as closed conditions. In 
the  ỉnn-conditional, the P-clause is presented as subjectively uncertain in the use-
context, although a past or present P-clause could, in principle, objectively be 
resolved as to whether it is right or wrong, should relevant evidence be available 
(e.g., to the addressee); a  future P-clause is predictive, allowing for the possibility 
of the pre-emption of the predicted or intended event. In the  hn-conditional, the 
P-clause is again excluded from the  actuality of the use-context, both temporally 
and epistemically, as a past counterfactual.
Direct comparison can be made across all three types of Late Egyptian con-
ditional in the case where the P-clause for each displays the standard past- tense 
form (the past sḏm=f). In this case, each type displays a clear distinction of 
meaning (albeit that the surviving sample set for ỉr ỉw sḏm=f with conditional 
meaning is rather small):
40  This seems amenable to a treatment along the lines of  Fauconnier (1997: chapters 4–5).
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ỉr-conditional with past sḏm=f in the P-clause
 (27)=(5) P. BM EA 10416, vso 11–12 ( Janssen 1991: pl. 17):
Context: A woman who has been sleeping with a man who is not her 
husband is under threat of violence. A steward has restrained those 
threatening violence once, but writes to the woman, pointing out the 
following:
yɜ    ỉr   ỉw   ỉ[n]ty(=ỉ)      sn m  pɜy     sp
exlm  cond sbrd restrain:pst=[1sg] 3pl in dem:m.sg occasion
bn   ỉw=ỉ    (r)    ỉnty=w       m  ky
neg  fut=1sg [:fut]  restrain:inf=3pl  in another
‘Indeed, (even) if I have restrained them this time, I won’t restrain them 
another (time).’
In this ỉr-conditional, the past event in the P-clause is treated as closed, as some-
thing which is accepted/treated simply as having happened.
 ỉnn-conditional with past sḏm=f in the P-clause
(28)  P. Mayer A (= P. National Museums Liverpool M11162), 2.15 ( Peet 1920: 
pl. Mayer A page 2):
Context: The priest Nesamun is being interrogated in place of his father 
Paybaki. He admits his father was involved in the thefts but says that 
he doesn’t know any of the details. He does, however, know of 3 men 
who were also involved. He names them and then says:
ỉnn  nw-tw       nbw
cond obtain:pst-imprs gold
mntw nɜ   nty      rḫ
3pl  def:pl rel[prs:3pl] know.res[-3pl]41
‘But if gold (really) was obtained, then they are the ones who know.’
In this  ỉnn-conditional, the user positions himself as being subjectively uncer-
tain as to whether or not gold actually was obtained from the robbery, but this 
41  The verb, rḫ ‘know’ is in the  stative (or  resultative) form, the principal alternative form of the 
verb in the first present (alongside ḥr + infinitive).
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could, in principle, be determined through relevant evidence, and he names 
three accomplices of his father who can confirm this. As such, the user distances 
himself nicely from the thefts. 
 hn-conditional with past sḏm=f in the P-clause
 (29) = (3) P. BM EA 10052, 4.13 ( Peet 1930: pl. 27):
Context: The trumpeter Amenkhau denies involvement in the robber-
ies. He says bpy=ỉ ptr ḫt nbt ‘I didn’t see anything’, and then strength-
ens his denial with a counterfactual conditional:
hn   ptrỉ=ỉ
cond  see:pst=1sg
wn    ỉw=ỉ    (r)   ḏd=f
be:pst fut=1sg [:fut]  say:inf=3sg.m
‘If had seen (anything), I would say so.’
In this  hn-conditional, the past event in the P-clause is treated as a counterfac-
tual, that is, as an event contrary to what is asserted actually to have taken place. 
The counterfactual meaning and counterfactual marking also extends to the 
counterfactual Q- clause.
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Web-sites
Deir el-Medina Database: <http://www.leidenuniv.nl/nino/dmd/dmd.html>. For bibliography 
and comments on Deir el-Medina texts (but does not include the tomb robbery papyri).
Deir el-Medine on-line: <http://obelix.arf.fak12.uni-muenchen.de/cgi-bin/mmcgi2mmhob/
mho-1/hobmain/>. Includes on-line publication of Late Egyptian texts in the Berlin Museum.
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